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ABSTRACT
The current level and form of subsidization of college education is often rationalized by appeal to
capital constraints on individuals. Because borrowing against human capital is difficult, capital
constraints can lead to nonoptimal outcomes unless government intervenes. We develop a simple
dynamic general equilibrium model of the economy that permits us to explore the impact of
alternative ways of subsidizing higher education. The key features of this model include
endogenously determined bequests from parents that can be used to finance schooling, uncertainty
in college completion related to differences in ability, and wage determination based upon the
amount of schooling in the economy. Because policies toward college lead to large changes in
schooling, it is very important to consider the general equilibrium effects on wages. Within this
structure, we analyze tuition subsidies such as exist in most public colleges, alternative forms of
need-based aid, income contingent loans, and merit-based aid. Each of these policies tends both to
improve the efficiency of the economy while yielding more intergenerational mobility and greater
income equality. But, the various policies have quite different implications for societal welfare, and



















Education holds a special position in most societies around the world. Governments quite uni-
formly subsidize schooling heavily, often making it free to the student. But it is not obvious why
governments intervene to this extent, particularly when discussing higher education. Nor is it clear
why government might choose one form of college subsidy over another. This paper explores the
implications of alternative subsidy schemes both from e¢ ciency and equity perspectives.
On the policy side, any suggestion that a government contemplates raising student fees for
higher education frequently brings a wave of protests. In the United States, political concerns
about rising tuition costs have led the U.S. Congress to hold hearings and contemplate legislation,
even though tuition policies are the province of state governments.1
Government intervention in education has nonetheless received relatively little research atten-
tion, particularly given the magnitude of programs. For K-12 education, government subsidy can
be rationalized by arguments about externalities related to socialization, facilitating democratic
government, and reducing crime.2 But such externalities appear considerably less important when
considering college education. Our earlier paper (Hanushek, Leung and Yilmaz (2003)) considered
pure redistributional motives along with externalities of education in production, but provided
limited general support for this form of government subsidization.3
A remaining argument for subsidization revolves around capital market imperfections and the
inability to borrow against human capital (e.g., Becker 1993[1964] or Garratt and Marshall 1994).
Because human capital is not good collateral for loans, individuals can ￿nd it di¢ cult to fund
college if the family cannot readily self-￿nance. Further, because any borrowing constraints are
likely to be related to parental income, the resulting decisions on college tend to inhibit intergen-
erational mobility. To the extent that society wishes to disentangle opportunities of individuals
from the socioeconomic status of their parents, subsidizing college may directly meet societal goals
1The pattern of net tuition by income groups in the U.S. is analyzed in Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2004).
2Of course as raised previously by Friedman (1962), these arguments do not establish the case either for the
magnitude of current intervention or for the form that involves direct production as opposed to subsidy.
3Consideration of direct distributional objectives is also the main thrust of Benabou (2002) and Caucutt and
Kumar (2003), although those papers are also directly related to our work here in that they explicitly consider the
dynamics of the problem.
1for distributional outcomes.
The existence and importance of credit constraints has been the subject of debate. In an
in￿ uential set of papers (Cameron and Heckman 1999, 2001; Carneiro and Heckman 2002), Heckman
and his coauthors argue that short run credit constraints are small even if longer run constraints
deriving from transmission of achievement are more substantial.4 As discussed below, while we
do not try to estimate the magnitude of these e⁄ects, we base our analysis on a presumption that
both exist.
This analysis delves directly into the intergenerational outcomes of various college subsidy
schemes in the presence of borrowing constraints. But, our previous paper demonstrated that
general equilibrium e⁄ects are very important to consider, because policies that have signi￿cant
impacts on college attendance and completion necessarily have direct e⁄ects on wages in the econ-
omy. Thus, any policy consideration must be embedded within a model that can accommodate
aggregate impacts on the economy. Systematic study into aspects of both the e¢ ciency and dis-
tributional impacts of educational policies has been growing over time (see, for example, Lowry
(1981), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Iyigun (1999), and Fender and Wang (2003)), and this
analysis is a natural extension of these inquiries.
Our objective is to develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that can provide insights into
the implications of various college aid policies for both the e¢ ciency of the economy and for the
distribution of outcomes over time. We begin in a world where short run borrowing constraints
stop some families from making optimal schooling decisions, implying that society will not achieve
its ￿rst best outcome without government intervention. Government has, however, a variety of
instruments for subsidizing education, and these instruments have di⁄erent implications for the
economy in both the short and long run.
To capture the dynamic nature of the problem, we employ an overlapping generations model
4Note that we do not separately analyze the importance of borrowing constraints but simply concentrate on the
implications that such constraints would have for the economy and the distribution of welfare. For other discussions
of the magnitude and nature of constraints on college attendance, see Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Kane (1999).
Other discussions such as the e⁄ect on enrollment of eliminating Social Security tuition support for children with a
deceased, disabled, or retired parent are relevant to our development of models where some children are constrained
by insu¢ cient parental support (Dynarski (2003)).
2where the economy is populated by a continuum of agents who live two periods and are part of
a continuum of two-agent families. In each ￿family￿ (or ￿dynasty￿ ), there is an old agent (or
￿parent￿ ) and an o⁄spring (or ￿child￿ ), and thus the population of the economy is constant over
time.
Heterogeneity of agents enters through ability di⁄erences that a⁄ect both the probability of
completing college and subsequent labor market productivity.5 Agents make optimizing decisions
with respect to enrolling in school under uncertainty of successful completion. Each family must,
however, fully fund the education of the child, so that in the absence of subsidies the child cannot
attend college whenever tuition exceeds the parents educational bequest. The parent passes along
bequests that interact with children￿ s ability to determine education in much the spirit of Lowry
(1981).
The subsidy schemes considered include a variety of common interventions: low tuition, need-
based grants, merit awards, and an income contingent loan. While the government can intervene
in the college market, it must maintain a balanced budget each period (which is a generation in
our two-period OLG model). Government intervention distorts the economy through taxes and
through changing college decisions with varying e¢ ciency losses across types of subsidy. This
basic economy, which is calibrated to match the stylized facts of the U.S. college market, permits
us to trace out the dynamics of the income distribution along with the impacts of government
intervention on overall output.
The impact of the di⁄erent college subsidies on output and social mobility is very di⁄erent.
While each tends to improve output compared to the constrained case, need-based policies lead
to signi￿cantly greater equality than merit-based policies. Further, targeted need-based policies
have desirable properties compared to the most common support for higher education ￿uniformly
reduced tuition at public colleges. Income contingent loans, while conceptually appealing, tend to
tax high ability poor people because of natural adverse selection.
5Throughout the analysis, college quality is assumed constant. Moreover, it ignores any potential impacts of
peers on quality or prices (Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2003)).
32 Basic Model of College Attendance and Completion
Individuals are thought of as living for two discrete periods.6 During the ￿rst period of life,
individuals make schooling decisions; during the second period, they work at a wage determined by
their educational attainment and provide funds for both the consumption and possible schooling
of their children. Each family consists of one parent and one child. Wages are determined by
an individual￿ s education (college completion or not) and ability. In each period, the old agent in
a typical household is characterized by education status i, i = e (educated);u (uneducated), and
ability/productivity x, x 2 [0;1]. The worker will inelastically supply one unit of her labor and
receive after-tax wage income of (1 ￿ ￿)kxwi units of consumption goods, where ￿ is the income
tax rate (if any) and k is a productivity parameter. The parent divides this income between a
bequest to her child of b and consumption, c. (Both items are assumed to be non-negative, i.e.,
b;c ￿ 0).7 The child, who is born earlier in the same period, is endowed with ability/productivity
x0 along with the bequest b. Thus, agents di⁄er in terms of both bequests and ability, and we
refer to (x0;b) as the ￿type￿of the child. To capture the observation that the ability of the parent
and the child are correlated, it is assumed that x0jx; x0 2 [0;1] follows a Markov process.8 The
underlying relationships for ability come from regressions of mother-child ability.9 The steady
state distribution of ability by education level is shown in the appendix along with the details of
the ability regressions and the underlying transmission mechanism.
6We consider an in￿nite time horizon. Time subscripts are suppressed except when there could be a confusion.
7Strictly speaking, the consumption c and the bequest b depends on the education status of the parent and hence
should have a superscript i. To avoid burdensome notation, however, we acknowledge this fact and suppress this for
the exposition.
8Our formulation could be consistent with an underlying endogenous school quality model where families in￿ uence
learning at the end of secondary schooling or a simple genetic transmission model. Recent empirical work on parent-
child achievement and schooling dynamics is found in Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2003) and Oreopoulos, Page,
and Stevens (2003). Using di⁄erent data and methodology to identify the transmission mechanism, they arrive at
somewhat di⁄erent conclusions about the role of environmental di⁄erences.
9This formulation is consistent with the Caneiro and Heckman (2003) analysis that suggests that long run impacts
of achievement di⁄erences by family income are the most serious issue of "capital constraints." For our purposes,
we take no position on the source of such di⁄erences and believe that they could arise from a combination of genetic
and environment factors; see also Mulligan (1999). Our approach di⁄ers signi￿cantly from the analysis in Lowry
(1981), Benabou (2002), and Caucutt and Kumar (2003), which each considers children￿ s ability to be independent
of parental ability.
42.1 Individual decisions
The child makes a college attendance decision in the ￿rst period. If she decides not to go to
college, she consumes all of the parental bequest within the ￿rst period and then is employed as
an uneducated worker during the second period. If she decides to go to college, she pays tuition,
￿; and consume the remaining bequest, b ￿ ￿; during the ￿rst period. Successful completion of
college is not guaranteed, however, but depends on her ability. She has a success probability of
x0 (her ability). Successful completion yields wages of an educated worker in the following period,
while failure leads to wages of an uneducated worker. (Note, however, that ability a⁄ects both
completion probabilities and subsequent productivity and earnings in a neutral manner similar to
Ben-Porath(1970)).
To highlight the importance of the tuition policy, a form of capital market imperfection is
assumed. Young agents can only ￿nance their education by bequest. Without governmental in-
tervention, tuition loans are unavailable. Thus, kids with bequest less than the amount of tuition,
b ￿ ￿, have no choice but to remain uneducated. Those who inherit ￿enough,￿b > ￿, can consume
all the bequest when they are young (leaving them to be uneducated workers when they are old),
or they can make the risky decision of going to college. Agents with ability x0 have a probability
x0 of success in college (whereby they would receive after-tax wages of (1￿￿) kx0we when they are
old) but probability (1 ￿ x0) of failure (whereby they would receive (1 ￿ ￿) kx0wu when they are
old). Regardless of their education outcome, they can still consume the after-tuition bequest b￿￿
in the ￿rst period.
Obviously, the schooling decision crucially depends on the individual￿ s utility function. We
adopt a "warm glow" utility function where parents get utility from providing bequests to children
but do not explicitly evaluate the future income or utility outcomes for children. To avoid the












2 are ￿rst and second period consumption, respectively, ￿ is the discount factor;
50 < ￿ < 1, and b0 is the bequest to be left for the child of the young agent.10
This simple bequest motive provides for endogenous support of children and their human capital
investments. It does not, however, have a parent adjusting support based on the ability of the
child (cf. Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986)) or any strategic purpose (e.g., Bernheim, Schleifer, and
Summers (1985)).11 It also presumes that the parent is indi⁄erent among the child￿ s choice either
to consume the bequest or to invest in further schooling.
The ￿nancial constraint on young people who have the ability to attend college but lack the
￿nancial means clearly leads to ine¢ ciency in the economy. While we do not analyze it, the ￿rst
best situation would clearly be making loans available to students facing borrowing constraints (see
the appendix). Of course, loans run into signi￿cant problems because of the well-recognized lack
of collateral. As a result, we concentrate on the analysis of existing types of college aid.
2.1.1 Capital constrained agents
For those who have insu¢ cient bequest, b ￿ ￿, the lifetime utility without government is easy
to calculate. In the ￿rst period, she will consume all the bequest, c0
1 = b: In the second period,
the agent trades o⁄ second period consumption and the bequest left to her child. Formally, the






b0￿1￿￿ ; s.t. c0
2 + b0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kx0wu0:
The optimal allocation is easy to see: c2 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)kx0wu0, b0 = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)kx0wu0: In words,
it means that consumption and bequest are a ￿xed fraction of the after-tax income. Hence, the




1 + ￿ (c0
2)
￿ (b0)
1￿￿ = b + ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)kx0wu0:
10For a more complete discussion of alternative formulations of the parental decision problem along with some of
their implications, see Banerjee (forthcoming).
11An alternative motivation emphasizes the precautionary savings aspects of household motivation (Dynan, Skinner,
and Zeldes (2002)).
62.1.2 Unconstrained agents
For those who can a⁄ord college education, the calculation is a little more complicated. If they







1￿￿ = b+￿￿￿(1￿￿)1￿￿(1￿￿)kx0wu0: If they do attend college,
their youth consumption is reduced from b to b￿￿ with certainty. Their second period consumption,






b0￿1￿￿ ; s.t. c0
2 + b0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kx0wi0;
i = e;u: It is easy to check that at the optimum, (c0
2)
￿ (b0)
1￿￿ = ￿￿￿(1￿￿)1￿￿(1￿￿)kx0w0i; for an
agent with education level i, i = e;u. Therefore, introducing the uncertainty of college completion,
the expected lifetime utility for an agent attending college becomes EUc(x0;b) = b￿￿+￿￿(x0Ue0+
(1 ￿ x0)Uu0), where ￿￿ = ￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1￿￿), Ui0 = (1 ￿ ￿)kx0wi0, i = e;u. We assume that youth
completely know their own ability and the future wages that will result from having or not having
a college education.12
Since going to college is a discrete choice, the decision rule here (and later with various education
subsidies) can be stated as a simple individual calculation of whether or not her ability is above a
minimum feasible investment level. This form of the rule is easy to see because the probability of
successful completion of college rises linearly with ability and the optimization involves trading o⁄
tuition payments for the expected future income. From the comparison of expected utilities in the




Importantly, some higher ability children (x0 > x￿) do not attend college because of ￿nancial
constraints. At the same time, the ability cuto⁄, x￿, for unconstrained children is lower than
it would be if the higher ability but constrained children attended (because college wages are
higher than would be if there were not ￿nancially constrained potential entrants). As a result, a
purely private market will lead to nonoptimal outcomes. The school attendance decision is shown
12The two-period utility function transfers discounted funds from the second period for the older agent to the
undiscounted ￿rst period consumption of children, which enters into our e¢ ciency calculations below. If, however,
bequests not used for college tuition are transferred to children in the second period of life ￿a death bequest instead
of an intervivos transfer ￿the results are essentially unchanged.
7schematically in Figure 1. Depending on the bequest relative to tuition, there are clear decision
regions that optimize for the individual.
2.2 College completion and schooling costs
The ability of an individual directly a⁄ects the chances of successfully completing college and
is therefore a central element of individual decision making. However, the aggregate success
probabilities for college attenders have another impact: It a⁄ects the cost of providing college and
thus the tuitions that must be charged to cover costs.
It is convenient to de￿ne a new indicator function, Ie0, to indicate the education outcome of
the young agent. Ie0 = 1 if the child enrolls and succeeds in college and Ie0 = 0 otherwise.13
Let ft(x;Ie) represent the amount (or the ￿measure￿ ) of agents with ability x and education
outcome Ie at time t and recall that the probability of success for an agent with ability x is also
x. By a version of the Law of Large Numbers,14 the enrollment needed to obtain ft(x;Ie = 1)
successfully educated agents is ft(x;Ie = 1)=x, 0 < x ￿ 1.15 Therefore, a total enrollment at
time (t ￿ 1) of Nr ￿
R ft(x;Ie=1)
x dx yields a supply of educated (or ￿skilled￿ ) workers at time t
of Ns ￿
R
ft(x;Ie = 1)dx.16 Since the young generation at time t needs to be educated in the
same period, a fraction of educated workers are employed in the colleges. We employ a very
simple education technology: to educate Nr0 ￿
R ft+1(x0;Ie0=1)
x0 dx0 young agents at time t (who will
participate in the labor market at time t + 1), rNr0 skilled workers need to be sacri￿ced, r > 0.17
The social costs of producing education are assumed to be entirely these labor costs, and these
determine tuition in the free market case.
2.3 Wage determination
13Clearly, with inadequate inheritance and/or inadequate ability (b ￿ ￿ or x
0 < x
￿), I
e0 = 0: Notice that, when
we characterize agents in terms of bequest and ability, it is in an ex ante concept, while this indicator function
characterizes the agents in terms of education outcomes and hence is an ex post measure. This permits us to
characterize a young agent (at time t) by (x
0;I
e0) rather than (x
0;b) and, similarly, the type of parents by (x;I
e):
14See Uhlig (1996) for the case with a continuum of agents.
15For x = 0; the probability of success is zero.
16In all the numerical implementation, the state space is discretized and hence the number of types becomes ￿nite
and the integration sign
R
(:)dx is changed to summation sign
P
(:).
17For instance, we need old agents who succeeded in education at time t, to teach the young agents at time t.
In this context, ￿ = teacher-pupil ratio ￿k: See Hanushek, Leung and Yilmaz (2003) for more justi￿cation of this
assumption.
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Figure 1:  School attendance in no subsidy regime 






ned Unconstrai :Wage determination depends on the mix of college completers and noncompleters in the market
at any point in time t. Because workers with di⁄erent abilities have varying skill, we consider
the total skilled workers employed in goods production at time t in e¢ ciency units which comes
from the total educated adult population less the college teachers: Es
t = Ee
t ￿ rNr0; where Ee
t =
R
kxft(x;Ie = 1)dx. Analogously, the total e¢ ciency units for unskilled labor at time t, which are




The production side of this model economy is kept simple with a CES production function,
which depends on both the e¢ ciency units of skilled and unskilled labor,
Yt = A[￿(Es
t)(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(Eu
t )(￿)]1=￿;
where 0 < ￿ < 1; and the elasticity of substitution is ￿ = 1=(1￿￿): Clearly, when ￿ = 0, this is the
Cobb-Douglas case. When ￿ = 1, Es
t and Eu
t are perfect substitutes, and when ￿ ! ￿1; the two
factors are perfect complements and the production function is Leontief.













2.4 The Aggregate Dynamics
The aggregate dynamics of this model are both simple and complicated. They are ￿simple￿because
there is no aggregate uncertainty in this model. In fact, with a continuum of agents, the laws of
motion for di⁄erent types are deterministic, despite the fact that there is an idiosyncratic (educa-
tion) risk for each young agent enrolled in college. On the other hand, the aggregate dynamics are
￿complicated￿because the macroeconomic variables in this model, such as the equilibrium wages,
depend on the distribution of the agents. Thus, it is necessary to keep track of the evolution of the
distribution in order to characterize the dynamics. Furthermore, there are two endogenous par-
ticipation constraints in the model: whether the young agent receives a su¢ ciently large bequest
for college (b 7 ￿) and whether the young agent has enough ability to make college attendance
9rational (x0 7 x￿). In this, both ￿ and x￿ are endogenous as they depend on wages that in turn
are a⁄ected by college attendance decisions.
To ￿x the idea, let Ft(x;Ie) be a vector representation of the distribution of all di⁄erent types
of agents at time t, 8x 2 [0;1], Ie = f1;0g. Then, the evolution of the economy can be captured
by a matrix equation
Ft+1(x0;Ie0) = ￿tFt(x;Ie);
where ￿t is the transition matrix of time t, incorporating the information of the transition prob-
abilities of abilities x0jx;18 the wages at time t; the distribution of wealth at time t, and perhaps
more subtly, the two previously mentioned endogenous participation constraints at time t.19
2.5 Outcomes without Government
2.5.1 Basic calibration of economy
While our main focus is alternative college aid schemes, it is useful to understand the charac-
teristics of this basic economy and the general role for government intervention. We calibrate
this basic model to mimic key elements of the U.S. labor and college markets. With no govern-
ment involvement, expenditure per pupil, which comes entirely from teacher labor costs, equals
tuition. The key parameter driving cost is the fraction of educated workers needed for work in
the college sector, r, and this is chosen such that ￿=we ￿the ratio of tuition to wages of edu-
cated workers ￿is set approximately to be 0:05:20 Note that a child is ￿nancially unconstrained if
b
we = (1￿￿)(1￿￿)x(Ie + wu
we(1￿Ie)) ￿
￿=we
k . If we know
￿=we
k , then we know who is constrained.




k is set so that the enrollment ratio
is about 59% in the stationary equilibrium. The elasticity of substitution parameter, ￿; is set to
be 2; and the discount factor, ￿￿, is set to be 0:96, which are in line with the estimates of Cooley
and Prescott (1995). Our "bequest" is best thought of as a combination of intervivos gifts and
18In the analysis below, the ability dynamics come from a Galtonian regression of the form: : x
0 = b0+b1x+error:
Assuming that the error term is normally distributed (which can be con￿rmed after running the regression), x0 j x
has a normal distribution. Details are presented in the appendix.
19A description of the determination of the matrix ￿t, which is technically involved, is available from the authors.
20As noted below, we calibrate w






10bequests at death. The literature on bequest motives is controversial, and data on ￿nancial ￿ ows
from parents are incomplete.21 The value of ￿ here is set to be 0:95; which implies that the agent
will leave 5 percent of their wealth as bequest, which seems to be within the range of the estimates
in the literature. Once we know who attends college and the aggregate enrollment ratio, we can
use the labor market clearing condition to set the stationary equilibrium wage ratio we
wu ￿ 1:70.22
These parameters imply that in equilibrium the fraction of work force in the education sector is
given by rNrr
Es+Eu ￿ 1:39 percent.
2.5.2 Economic outcomes
There are two outcomes that could support government intervention in these markets. The overall
outcomes are described in ￿gure 2. First, eight percent of all agents are capital constrained ￿i.e.,
they would have attended college had their families had su¢ cient funds to pay for tuition.23 (The
constrained group represents 22 percent of the children from families where bequests are less than
tuition).24 Because of these constraints, the people attending college are lower quality than they
otherwise would have been. One implication of this is that the college failure rate of 25 percent is
also high, and the costs of providing college education are thus excessive.25 This simple constraint
leads to an overall e¢ ciency loss for the economy of 4.7 percent.
Second, the patterns of economic success tend to have considerable inertia. Figure 2 shows
that the schooling outcomes di⁄er dramatically by whether the student faces borrowing constraints
or not. The correlation of mother-child income for the population is 0.45, in the range of previous
￿ndings by Solon (1992). The probability that a daughter is uneducated given that the mother is
21A variety of models concentrate on intrafamily distributions, albeit from di⁄erent underlying views on behavior;
see Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), Berhneim, Schleifer, and Summers (1985), Bernheim and Severinov (2003). These
models frequently highlight di⁄erences in bequests among siblings, something that Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004)
question. Our interest here is nonetheless the level and not the intrafamily pattern of bequests. Congressional
Budget O¢ ce (2004) con￿rms that parental contributions are an important component of the funding of college
attendance.
22To do this, we go to the production function to set ￿ = 0:607 and the scale parameter A = 1:5874 so that w
e = 1
in the stationary equilibrium.
23This number of constrained agents is consistent with the calculations of Caneiro and Heckman (2002) except
their calculations are based on existing U.S. aid programs.
24Note that the correlation of ability and income across generations implies that the ability distribution of con-
strained families is skewed to the lower end (see the appendix).
25Note, however, that the failure rate in the base case is below that for U.S. college attenders. For U.S. high
school graduates in the class of 1992, only 45 percent of those enrolling in postsecondary schooling had achieved a
bachelor￿ s degree by 2000 (Adelman et al., 2003).












college successuneducated is 0.76, and this only falls to 0.66 after ￿ve generations.
Clearly, the ￿nancial constraints inhibit the economy from reaching maximum outcomes through
purely private decisions. The correlations across generations of education and income may also be
a concern to those who wish higher degrees of intergenerational mobility. These two arguments
have been used to support a wide variety of educational subsidies by the government, so we turn
to details of the alternatives and their impacts.
3 Di⁄erent College Aid Schemes
We now consider how alternative government interventions a⁄ect these outcomes.26 The govern-
ment raises funds for college student aid with a proportional income tax and maintains a balanced
budget every period.27
3.1 Uniform Subsidy
The largest and most common subsidy to college students is the reduced tuition that students
receive. Public colleges and universities invariably maintain tuition below production costs, even
for nonresidents of the separate states.28 The government collects a uniform rate of tuition ￿
and a uniform tax rate ￿ from all agents. The proceeds are used exclusively to cover the costs of
education (which is the wage bill for the teachers), as in:
rNr0
we = ￿Nr0
+ ￿(weEs + wuEu):
Notice that, when the income tax rate is zero ( ￿ = 0), the regime is reduced to purely private
education as discussed above, and the tuition is equal to the social cost of college education, i.e.,
26Fender and Wang (2003) consider alternatives of public provision (and decision making on attendance) as an
alternative to the approaches here.
27Our approach di⁄ers from that in Caucutt and Kumar (2003). They begin with a series of policy objectives
including making the college decision independent of family income, maximizing the fraction of students with a college
degree, and introducing merit aid. They then consider the welfare e⁄ects of each.
28Details of current U.S. aid can be found in McPherson and Schapiro (1991), Kane (1999), and Congressional
Budget O¢ ce (2004). Nonresident tuition, applying both to U.S. citizens who are residents of other states and to
nonU.S. citizens, is typically above that charged to state residents but below the total production costs. Private
universities also tend to price tuition below total production costs, largely through subsidies from endowment (see
McPherson, Schapiro, and Winston 1993), although the support from past private donations are di¢ cult to include
in this analysis.
12rwe = ￿:
Under di⁄erent tax rates (and thus subsidy sizes), the unconstrained individuals still have the
same simple decision rule identi￿ed previously. As shown in ￿gure 1, attendance still depends
simply on ability relative to the decision point, x￿.
One common element of the various subsidy schemes is that they induce a larger number of
children to enroll in school. These choices are optimal in an ex ante sense, but the higher attendance
rates also yield higher failure rates when they induce lower ability agents to attempt college. Thus,
in an ex post sense, there are greater numbers of people who enter the work phase with the skills of
the uneducated but with a tuition bill that must be paid o⁄ ￿making them worse o⁄ ex post than
if they had not attempted college.
3.2 Means-Tested Subsidy Schemes
Many college subsidies, however, go beyond the simple uniform tuition cuts and attempt to ￿ne
tune the subsidies to the ability to pay of the student/parent. We consider two alternative versions
of means-tested subsidies de￿ned by the amount of information about parental ability to pay and
by whether the subsidy is constant across individuals or not. In each, only those who attend
college and are identi￿ed as ￿poor￿will be subsidized.
3.2.1 Imperfect information with ￿ at subsidy
We begin with the possibility that the parent￿ s bequest might not be perfectly observable to the
government. Here we take to the extreme and assume that the government cannot observe the
income of the parents (old agents) but can observe their education levels. In the current setting,
high ability people tend to enroll in college and tend to get higher wage (recall that the total wage of
an agent is kxwi, i = e;u, which is proportional to the ability). Thus, the group of more educated
people and highly paid people overlap signi￿cantly in this setting.
Formally, if the parent succeeded in college (Ie = 1), then the child is not eligible for the subsidy,
and hence the child is required to pay full cost of the college education, ￿ = rwe. The children of
unskilled parents (Ie = 0), however, receive an amount m for enrolling in college, implying their
13tuition is ￿ = rwe ￿ m.
Since the subsidy scheme is targeted on those who enroll in college, the utility for those who
do not enroll remains unchanged, EUu(x0;b) = b + ￿￿Uu, where Uu = (1 ￿ ￿)kxwu. The expected
utility of children going to college now equals EUc(x0;b) = b￿￿ +m(1￿Ie) +￿￿(x0Ue0+(1￿x0)Uu0):
It is easy to see that a version of the previous solution holds, with the quali￿cation that both the
￿threshold level of bequest￿ and ￿threshold level of ability￿ depends on the education level of
parents.
There is still a constrained group where tuition less any subsidy exceeds the bequest. For this
group, the child does not enroll regardless of ability. This is seen at the top of Figure 3. But
now the decision rule varies with parental education. For children with an uneducated parent,
there is an ability cuto⁄ determining whether attendance is optimal: x￿(Ie = 0): For children with
an educated parent, since they must pay the full tuition, there is a di⁄erent cuto⁄ that is higher:
x￿(Ie = 1). The result that x￿(Ie = 1) ￿ x￿(Ie = 0), depicted in ￿gure 2, is not surprising. Since
kids with educated parents are denied any education subsidy, their ￿nancial gains of attending
college are less than those for children of uneducated parents, and thus only the more capable ones
will try.29
The government budget constraint is also simple. Since the kids with educated parents are
not eligible for subsidy, the government expenditure is concentrated on those whose parents are






j (x;Ie = 0)
i
ft(x;Ie = 0)
x0 dx0 ￿ Nr;m0
:
Hence, the government budget constraint is
mNr;m0
= ￿(weEs + wuEu):
3.2.2 Perfect information with variable subsidy
An alternative is to allow the tuition to be (weakly) increasing in wealth. Students who have
larger bequests pay more in tuition. In practice, this scheme, which resembles much of the current
29There is also a small group of children whose parents are educated but who remain ￿nancially constrained and
thus do not attend college.
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Figure 3:  School attendance in constant means-tested regime 





























e : ) 1 (U.S. aid, will lead to ￿false reporting￿and other information asymmetry problems. Moreover, while
ignored here, there are obvious incentives for parents to adjust their bequests, since the government
will partially compensate for any lesser funds for the child. In this paper, however, we only want
to examine the case where wealth can be perfectly observed, and we assume away the informational
asymmetry issue. This provides the benchmark result for subsidies of the need-based type.
In practice, need-based subsidies vary signi￿cantly in details, including typically being very
non-linear. We nonetheless focus on the linear case, so that the intuition is more transparent and
the calculations are simpli￿ed. We characterize tuition as an increasing function of the bequest
each child receives,
￿(b) = ￿1 + ￿2b;
where ￿1 ￿ 0 is the minimum level of tuition to be paid, and ￿2, 0 ￿ ￿2 ￿ 1, is the incremental
increase in tuition for each additional unit of bequest. It is clear that if ￿2 = 0; the present regime
is reduced to the uniform subsidy case. Under this regime, those with too little bequest will be
unable to a⁄ord college, b ￿ ￿(b) () b ￿ ￿1=(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿￿: For those who can a⁄ord college,
b > ￿￿, the decision depends on the ability they inherited from parents. The decision rule is a
slight modi￿cation of the earlier ones, since the attendance cuto⁄ is directly related to the child￿ s
bequest: x0 ￿ x￿(b).
In this case, each agent has a critical value of ability/productivity, x￿(b); that determines
attendance, but it is increasing in the level of bequest the young agent receive.30 An implication is
that this scheme will facilitate social mobility in ex ante terms because, other things being equal,
kids from poor families are more likely to enroll in college with this subsidy (compared to no
subsidy). They thus will have a higher chance to become a skilled worker in the later stage of
life. In the calibration analysis, we return to check this ex ante intuition, qualitatively as well as
quantitatively.
The government budget under this subsidy is modi￿ed as
30x





we = ￿n + ￿(weEs + wuEu);
where ￿n is the total amount of tuition collected under this variable subsidy scheme.
3.3 Income-Contingent Loans
Income contingent loans allow young agents to borrow for tuition (though it is not compulsory)
with the condition that the repayment depends on their future income. Such aid policies have
been advocated in a variety of circumstances and have been implemented in various countries at
the same time that fees were introduced.31
To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that young agents either borrow the full amount of the
tuition or do not borrow at all.32 Young agents who do borrow will consume the bequest inherited
from their parents in the ￿rst period. In the second period, they repay a ￿xed fraction of their
after-income tax income, ￿￿ ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)kx0wi￿
, 0 < ￿￿ < 1, i = e;u. Hence, they are left with only
(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)kx0wi￿
, i = e;u, for their second period consumption and the bequest they leave
to their kids. Notice that, while the amount of repayment depends on the second period income
(and hence the education outcome), the repayment as a fraction of the income is independent of
the income. Thus, the income-contingent loans formulated here can also be interpreted as a type
of ￿pro￿t-sharing￿of the return on individual human capital investment.
The key element of this plan is, however, that the loan pool must maintain a zero balance.
Thus, if somebody has a low income and repays less than tuition, there must be others in the loan
pool who pay more than they borrowed for tuition, so that the loan pool remains solvent.
To facilitate the discussion, we introduce a new indicator function Il;
Il =
￿
1 if the agent borrows
0 otherwise
:
31For discussions of alternative programs and the rationales, see Barr (1989, 2001), Chapman (1997), and Dresch
(1974). The arguments stress both borrowing constraints (and distributional issues) and the insurance aspects related
to income risk.
32Note that this is not the most general form, which would allow individuals to borrow a varying amount to close
the gap between bequest and tuition. This added complication would not change the basic character of our results.
16We now characterize an individual￿ s type by (x0;b;Il). The expected utility of a young agent
depends on whether she attends college and whether she borrows the income-contingent loan (ICL
henceforth), EU(x0;b) = maxfEUe(x0;b;0); EUc(x0;b;1), EUu(x0;b;0)g.33 The lifetime utility
of a young agent under this scheme can be summarized as follows:
EUc(x0;b;0) = b ￿ ￿ + ￿￿(x0Ue + (1 ￿ x0)Uu) attends college without ICL
EUc(x0;b;1) = b + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)(x0Ue + (1 ￿ x0)Uu) attends college with ICL
EUu(x0;b;0) = b + ￿￿(Uu) does not attend college
;
where Ui = (1 ￿ ￿)kx0wi, i = e;u.
The decision rules are clear. For young agents who are ￿nancially constrained, b ￿ ￿; attending
college without an ICL is not an option, and they only need to evaluate when EUc(x0;b;1) >
EUu(x0;b;0), which occurs when x > x￿





.34 (We will use "C" for
￿nancially constrained, "U" for ￿nancially unconstrained, "L" for taking the loan, and "P" for
private ￿nancing). Notice that x￿
CL does not directly depend on ￿. For the ￿nancially constrained
agents, the cost of college education is not the tuition ￿ but the additional tax on future income.
For those who are not ￿nancially constrained, there are three choices: going to college with
an ICL, going to college without an ICL, and not going to college at all. With higher ability,
the borrower must repay a larger amount for the tuition loan and will in e⁄ect be subsidizing low
ability students. Thus, high ability people will ￿nance school privately as long as their ability
is above some threshold, x￿
UP, that is determined in part by the tuition amount. At the other
end, unconstrained students have the same decision rule as constrained with respect to the cuto⁄
between attending with an ICL and not attending, i.e., they attend with a loan if x0 ￿ x￿
CL. In
between these two is a third decision point for unconstrained students ￿where they decide between
attending with and without an ICL. For ability above this point, x￿
UL, they attend without a loan,
because taking the loan would entail subsidizing the low ability (low expected wage) people. Below
that point, they would take the loan even though they did not need it, because the higher ability
people in the loan pool are expected to subsidize them so that their loan repayment is less than
the tuition charge.35
33EU
u(x;b;1) is ruled out because those who do not attend college are not eligible for tuition loan.
34The details of the formulae for the income-contingent loans are available from the authors.
35The details of the di⁄erent regimes are available from the authors.
17Figure 4 summarizes the decision rules with an ICL. While the constrained agents have no choice
except take the loan if they wish to attend school, unconstrained agents have greater latitude and
are thus better o⁄.
There are two possible equilibrium outcomes for the unconstrained. Loosely speaking, when the
repayment ratio, ￿￿; is low enough, people who are in the middle of the ability distribution would
take ICL. The high ability people would go to college without the ICL, and the low ability people
would not go to college at all. When the repayment ratio ￿￿ becomes too high enough, even the
people in the middle of the ability distribution would not take the ICL, and the loan regime would
not include any unconstrained people.
If there is a viable loan pool, there must be some high income participants who participate
and who subsidize anybody who repays less than tuition. But, this is just the calculation that
unconstrained agents are making. If taking the loan requires repayment of more than tuition,
the unconstrained agent will privately ￿nance. The unconstrained agent will participate only if
subsidized; this occurs when she has marginally low ability. The only group of agents who will
participate and will subsidize the lower ability attendees are the high ability but constrained agents.
In other words, the smart poor end up subsidizing the other participants, including the lower ability
rich kids.
A completely unrestricted income contingent loan system cannot, however, really operate (at
least within the structure of our model). If anybody can join the loan pool, very low ability people
will have incentives to "take a chance" on college ￿because they are highly subsidized and there is
no real cost to doing so. Without opportunity costs, which are not a feature of our model, almost
everybody could try college attendance in the hopes of getting lucky and completing. Therefore,
in our calculations and in reality, an ICL scheme would almost certainly include a separate ability
cuto⁄ for eligibility to join the pool.
The aggregate dynamics and government budget constraints are more complicated than the
other regimes, since in ex post terms, agents di⁄er in three dimensions: ability x, educational









Figure 4:  School attendance in income contingent loan (ICL)














ned Unconstrai :scenario is complicated as well as there are in fact two budget constraints. The ￿rst constraint is the
usual one, that the total expenditure on education does not exceed the sum of the total tuition and
the total income collected for schooling. The second constraint is that the total income-contingent
loans made in each period do not exceed the total repayment collected.
3.4 Merit-based Tuition subsidy
The ￿nal alternative we consider is to channel ￿nancial aid according to student ability/productivity.
A simple parameterization is to allow the tuition to be (weakly) decreasing in ability. Students
who have higher ability pay less in tuition, and those who have lower ability will pay more. In
practice, this scheme will depend on some ￿proxy￿(such as SAT) because ability is not easy to
de￿ne, let alone to measure accurately. In this paper, however, we only want to examine the case
where ability/productivity is one-dimensional and can be perfectly observed, and we assume away
the informational asymmetry issues.
While merit-based subsidy is typically very non-linear (for instance, only the top few students
receive scholarship and others receive none), we will focus on the linear case:
￿(x0) = ￿3 ￿ ￿4x0;
where ￿3 > 0 is the maximum level of tuition to be paid, and ￿4, 0 ￿ ￿4 ￿ 1, is the incremental
decrease in tuition for each additional unit of ability. The tuition is restricted to be non-negative,
￿(x0) = ￿3￿￿4x0 ￿ 0.36 If ￿4 = 0; the present regime is reduced to the uniform subsidy case. Under
this regime, those with too little bequest will be unable to a⁄ord college (when b ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿4x0 ￿
￿￿(x0): For those who could a⁄ord it, i.e., b > ￿￿(x0), the decision depends on the ability they
inherited from parents. The decision rule is similar to those previously except that tuition varies
with ability, leading to a variable attendance rule.
For young agents with higher ability/productivity x0, ￿￿(x0) is lower, and hence they are more
likely to enroll in college.37 If the ability/productivity of parents and o⁄springs is positively corre-
lated, education decisions will be correlated across generations. Speci￿cally, because higher ability
36This assumption can be relaxed but is imposed here just to simplify the analysis.
37The condition involves a quadratic equation in x
0 which there always exists a positive root and a negative root.
We de￿ne that positive root to be x
￿:
19parents are generally richer, the merit based policy implicitly involves some subsidy to the rich ￿
which is likely to have implications for the income inequality and mobility generated.
The government budget under the need-based subsidy is modi￿ed as
rNr0
we = ￿m + ￿(weEs + wuEu);
where ￿m is the total amount of tuition collected under merit-based subsidies:(Note that this has
the same form as the need-based subsidy with just an alteration of who gets the subsidies).
3.5 Equilibrium
For the simulations of the di⁄erent schemes, we apply a common de￿nition of equilibrium. We
also concentrate on the steady state results for our economy.
De￿nition 1 The equilibrium of this model economy is a series of wages fwe;wug
1
t=0 and a series
of wealth distributions fFt(x;Ie)g
1
t=0 such that the agents maximize their individual expected utility,
the factor markets are cleared, and the government balances its budget.
Attention is focused exclusively on the case where we > wu with the steady state being:
De￿nition 2 A steady state of the model economy is a series of equilibrium such that fwe;wug,
fFt(x;Ie)g are all invariant over time.
3.6 E¢ ciency, Equality and Mobility
There is a major problem in simply looking at the marginal conditions for attendance under the
di⁄erent scenarios. The subsidy programs have large e⁄ects on the schooling behavior of the
population, and this results in substantial changes in the cost of schooling and in the wages of people
who enter the labor market with di⁄erent skills. Further, when considering the characteristics of
intergenerational mobility, it is clear that any changes in patterns accumulate over generations. To
deal with these issues, we return to our basic general equilibrium model and simulate the impacts of
alternative subsidy schemes. As noted, the prior benchmark indicates that substantial ine¢ ciency
exists in the absence of government intervention ￿because smart poor kids cannot a⁄ord schooling
20and remain uneducated. Moreover, the borrowing constraints tend to lock in family status across
generations.
3.6.1 Individual outcomes with di⁄erent subsidies
We simulate each of the subsidies under a range of tax rates, which index the size of the governmental
intervention. In order to provide an understanding of the general equilibrium implications of each
of the schemes, we begin with a description of how the uniform tuition subsidy impacts the economy.
Figure 5 traces out the patterns of college attendance and completion under di⁄erent tax rates and
tuitions. While tuition starts at 4.9 percent of wages for educated workers, it falls to 1.58 percent
at a tax rate of 1.6 percent. This fall in tuition induces a large increase in college attendance ￿
from 59 to 87 percent. A substantial portion of this increase comes from a fall in "constrained"
agents (ones who have the required ability to attend optimally but lack su¢ cient funds to cover
tuition), which goes from 28 percent of the low-bequest agents to less than four percent. Figure
5, however, also vividly shows that a large portion of the increase in attendance is translated into
failure to complete college successfully. Nonetheless, the successfully completing students increase
from 34 percent with no government to 46 percent with a 1.6 percent tax rate for tuition subsidies.
The patterns for the other subsidies lead to somewhat di⁄erent results. Figure 6 shows the
comparable patterns for the need-based subsidies that involve a lump sum distribution to unedu-
cated parents. Compared to the tuition subsidy, the constrained group is driven even lower with a
1.6 percent education tax. It also achieves a higher attendance rate (over 92 percent), but virtually
all of this gain comes with from an increase in failed college students. (The linear needs-based
plan is hard to distinguish from the lump sum plan. Virtually all of the conclusions remain the
same, so we do not separately review those results).
Merit aid produces a strikingly di⁄erent pattern (Figure 7). The tilting of tuition advantages
toward the high ability students induces fewer people to attend and retains more constrained
students. As the amount of aid increases, almost the same number of students successfully complete
college, but fewer attend in the ￿rst place, failures are dramatically less (33 percent at a tax of
1.6 percent compared to 45 percent for the means-tested subsidy), and over ￿ve percent of the




































college successpopulation remains ￿nancially constrained.
The income contingent loans take a di⁄erent approach to the problem. If we ignore any po-
tential problems of default, misreporting incomes, and the like, the ICL scheme e⁄ectively removes
the borrowing constraints. Anybody with su¢ cient ability can borrow for their tuition with a
repayment rate that ensures that the fund is ￿scally balanced.38 Thus, without any government
intervention, the economy can immediately improve outcomes and achieve close to maximum ef-
￿ciency. The program, as noted earlier, does nonetheless have some very speci￿c redistribution
involved. Constrained high ability people ￿people who could not attend college without a loan but
have high enough college and labor market opportunities to yield incomes that more than repay
their loans ￿end up subsidizing low ability people (both constrained and unconstrained).39
The results of an unsubsidized ICL are shown in ￿gure 8. In these calculations, an ability cuto⁄
of 0.6 is applied to be eligible for participation in the loan pool, and, because of the correlation of
mother-daughter abilities, fewer constrained households meet these requirements. With the eligi-
bility requirement, any agent with ability greater than 0.7 would subsidize eligible borrowers with
lower ability. These "taxed" agents are all from the constrained group (because the unconstrained
can self-￿nance and avoid taxation). They end up subsidizing the schooling of a number of lower
ability constrained students and a larger number of lower ability unconstrained students.
3.6.2 Aggregate outcomes
The question still remains, "What di⁄erence does all of this make?" In order to address this larger
issue, we turn to the aggregate implications for output, distribution, and intergenerational mobility.
Before doing that, however, it is useful to note the importance of considering these questions in
a general equilibrium setting. Each of these subsidies has large implications for the distribution
of workers in the labor market, and this in turn directly a⁄ects wages. The increase in college
completion (which is approximately the same for each of the need-based and merit-based subsidies
38As noted above, an unrestricted program ￿in the absence of any opportunity costs ￿will encourage very low
people to take a chance at college even though the success probabilities are low because they are heavily subsidized.
For our simulations, we apply the added constraint that ability must be 0.6 or higher.
39We actually consider a variant that simultaneously has government using a uniform tuition reducation subsidy
in addition to the loan opportunities. As the tuition goes down with more government subsidy, participation in the
ICL probrams falls because there are fewer constrained high ability people.
22Fig. 8: Distribution of Choices with Unsubsidized Income 












self financeddiscussed when going to a common 1.6 percent tax rate) drives down the wage ratio for college
educated compared to uneducated workers from 1.7 to 1.3, leading to a substantially more equal
distribution of income. Thus, simply calculating aggregate e⁄ects with constant prices would yield
very misleading results.
The ￿rst aggregate outcome that we note is that each of the subsidies improves the e¢ ciency of
the economy by substantially reducing if not eliminating the group of capital constrained potential
students. Figure 9 plots the e¢ ciency losses that occur at each tax rate and shows that each of
the government interventions leads to improved functioning of the economy. It is of course not
necessary that the interventions uniformly improve the economy, regardless of level, because they
also introduce their own distortions.40 Indeed, at the higher levels of tax and subsidy with the
uniform tuition reduction, the distortions of the scheme begin to outweigh the gains and e¢ ciency
losses increase. Similar outcomes occur for the other subsidies if tax rates and subsidies are allowed
to go higher than we present. These increasing distortions occur as tuition approaches zero.
3.6.3 Distributional outcomes
Government subsidy for college education continues to be motivated by attention to the distribution
of welfare in the society. There are a variety of ways in which this can be viewed. First, one might
ask whether government policy leads to more equality in addition to the e¢ ciency gains already
discussed. Figure 10 provides some insight into this. It plots steady state values of both Aggregate
Expected Utility (the sum of utilities in the society) against one minus the gini coe¢ cient. Since
the gini measures distance from equality, higher values of 1-gini indicate more equality of utility.
In this ￿gure we plot just the e⁄ects of uniform tuition subsidies and of merit aid. Interestingly,
within the range of taxes and subsidies considered previously, government intervention leads both
to higher output and to more equality. The need-based subsidies do, however, consistently lead to
more equality than the merit-based subsidy.
Uniform tuition subsidies also dominate merit aid. They can achieve a similar locus of e¢ ciency
40Note also that our simpli￿ed economy has ￿xed labor supply. This acts to minimize the distortion from a larger
government, since individuals do not ajust to higher tax rates. Our previous analysis (Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz
(2003) allows for tax distortions of labor supply, and these have a signi￿cant impact on the e¢ ciency of the economy.
These distortions would tend to counteract the gains made from eliminating the costrained individuals.


















































































merit aidand equality as need based aid. At lower levels of taxes and program size, however, uniform
subsidies yield more ine¢ ciency that need based aid. Income contingent loans lie in between the
need based and merit aid loci.
Second, the various policies can clearly a⁄ect the patterns of intergenerational mobility. One
simple measure of mobility is the relationship between mother￿ s education and that of subsequent
generations. In Figure 11 we plot the probability that a child is educated given that the matriarch
is uneducated. We do this for varying numbers of generations under alternative subsidy schemes.
We also plot the unsubsidized, or no-government, case. With each of the subsidies, we compare the
intergenerational mobility that comes from a tax rate of 0.8 percent under the varying governmental
interventions, although the pattern is quite consistent across di⁄erent tax rates. Two attributes
of these patterns stand out. The most signi￿cant di⁄erence among the plans or the absence of
government is the fact that the mobility asymptotes at a di⁄erent level. This varying steady-state
degree of mobility re￿ ects most importantly the equilibrium enrollment rates under the di⁄erent
plans. Additionally, the mobility patterns are quite similar in shape, with substantial gains in
the ￿rst two generations (achieving roughly 60 percent of the steady-state level). This increasing
mobility with generations largely results from the imperfect transmission of ability and not from
di⁄erential e⁄ects of the programs.
Third, while the aggregate results are interesting, it is useful to trace the exact pattern of
subsidies to people in di⁄erent parts of the income distribution. Figure 12 displays the net subsidy
under di⁄erent schemes with varying tax rates according the distribution of outcomes for the
children. Speci￿cally, the average tuition discount and taxes paid by the child once she enters
the labor market are given for each decile of the children￿ s income distribution. The schemes are
quite di⁄erent with the incidence of the net subsidies for merit programs being almost the inverse
of those for uniform programs or need based programs. The uniform subsidy and the need based
subsidy in general use net taxes on upper income people to subsidize people in the 2nd through
6th deciles of the distribution. But, in both cases and particularly at lower tax rates/program
sizes, children in the bottom decile also pay a net tax, in large part because they seldom attend
24Fig. 11: Parent-Offspring Evolution of Education 


















































































 school but end up paying for a portion of the redistribution through taxes. The merit system on
the other hand systematically rewards people at the top of the ability distribution ￿exactly those
who most often succeed at school and who earn the most in the labor market. (At high subsidy,
however, the top decile will pay net taxes related to their high incomes).
If these incidence pictures were drawn for parents income, the usual object of policy discussions,
the pictures would be qualitatively the same. The biggest di⁄erence is higher and more extensive
net taxes on the bottom two deciles of the mother￿ s income distribution.
Finally, it is useful to follow exactly what groups are better o⁄and which are worse o⁄when the
subsidies are introduced. In the general equilibrium economy, a variety of forces are operating. The
previous discussions described the patterns of net subsidies by the income distribution, but it is also
possible to describe how people situated in di⁄erent parts of the ability-bequest distribution fare
under the subsidies. The largest winners under the subsidy schemes are high ability constrained
people who could not attend school without intervention. But the government actions also improve
the e¢ ciency of the economy, while leading to some substantial changes in wages for both educated
and uneducated. To understand the total impact, we compare the no-government economy with
varying levels of uniform subsidies (for ￿ up to 1.8 percent). In all cases, the consistent loser
from introducing the subsidy is the group of unconstrained people (in the no-government case) who
would attend college without any intervention. For them, wages fall and taxes increase su¢ ciently
to overcome any bene￿ts of paying lower tuition. Among the remaining unconstrained groups,
both those who go to school with the subsidy and those who do not attend school in any case gain.
The latter group is interesting, because their wage improvements are su¢ cient to cover any taxes to
subsidize others. Finally, initially constrained people who do not attend college even with subsidies
gain with smaller programs (where wage gains exceed taxes), but lose with larger programs (where
the opposite holds). These results reinforce the importance of considering signi￿cant subsidy
policies in a general equilibrium setting, where the changes in wages and overall performance of the
economy have signi￿cant impacts.
254 Concluding Remarks
In order to understand the potential role of government intervention into college education it is
important to consider the implications of borrowing constraints. Without passing judgment on
the importance of such constraints, we ￿nd that they provide strong justi￿cation for some kind
of governmental intervention into college ￿nance. At the same time, not all policies have the
same bene￿ts. We trace the implications of common policies for both the level and distribution of
outcomes in the economy.
A key analytical aspect of this work is the use of a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
College policies have signi￿cant impacts on the schooling and skills of the workers in the economy,
and the impact of these policies on wages cannot be ignored. Moreover, the focus of many policy
proposals toward college education is the potential impact on economic mobility across generations.
These issues cannot be addressed within the common static, partial equilibrium framework.
The results highlight the distributional e¢ ciency implications of college subsidies, re￿ ecting
the continuing importance of such issues in the public policy debate. In a world with budget
constraints, the overall e¢ ciency of the economy can clearly be helped by ￿nding mechanisms that
allow high ability but poor children to attend school. In most respects this is easiest and most
e¢ ciently done with need-based policies. Merit based policies, while often motivated more by
individual institutions competing for students, perform quite poorly in terms of the distributional
implications.
Income contingent loans, which have become quite popular, have considerable appeal compared
to much of the current policy debate. The current policy debate often focuses entirely on parental
income, neglecting the potentially large variance in the child￿ s future income. Nonetheless, the
design of these schemes is especially important. With no government subsidy, any insurance
elements of the program ￿guarding against low income realizations ￿must be paid for by others in
the risk pool. This implies the potential for considerable adverse selection: people who expect high
incomes will enter the pool only if they have to borrow the money. In our world, the smart but
constrained individuals subsidize less smart people who are both constrained and unconstrained.
26Our e⁄orts take polar cases of subsidies and consider their implications. Nothing precludes
mixing policies to obtain multiple objectives in an e¢ cient way. Indeed, the programs currently in
existence (see Kane (1999) and Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2004)) include elements of all of the
programs we consider. The analysis here suggests a way to add up the various programs and to
ascertain the full short and long run implications.
27Appendix
A First Best Policy
In the main model, we have presumed imperfect capital markets. For comparison, we can also
consider the following scenario with government-supported tuition loan. For agents who would
enroll, suppose that they can borrow against their future, i.e. anybody can borrow as much
as they want (say m ) and pay back with an interest (1 + r) ￿ m: The interest rate r is set
to be 1 + r = 1
￿￿, so that borrowings purely for intertemporal substitution of consumption is not
pro￿table. Thus, if an agent would like to borrow for college, it serves only to close the gap between
the amount of tuition and the bequest to the child, m = b￿￿: It means that, for an agent who would
borrow to go to college, EUb(x0;b) = b￿￿+m +￿￿ [x0(Ue0 ￿ (1 + r)m) +(1 ￿ x0)(Uu0 ￿ (1 + r)m)]
= b ￿ ￿ + ￿￿(x0Ue0 + (1 ￿ x0)Uu0), as ￿￿(1 + r) = 1; which is exactly equal to the expected utility
for agents who do not need to borrow. In other words, the existence of government loan erases the
di⁄erence in incentives for those who are ￿nancially constrained and those who are not.
A child of type (x0;b) attends college if EUe(x0;b) ￿ EUu(x0;b) (i.e. x ￿ x￿). Since the interest
rate exactly o⁄sets the discount factor, those who are not ￿nancially constrained (b ￿ ￿) would not
borrow. For a ￿nancially constrained agent (b < ￿), the amount of borrowing is b ￿ ￿: And recall
that b = (1￿￿)(1￿￿) ￿kx ￿[we ￿ Ie + wu ￿ (1 ￿ Ie)] ￿ b(x;Ie): Let Ib￿ be an indicator function,
which only takes on value zero and one,
Ib￿ =
￿
1 if b(x;Ie) ￿ ￿
0 otherwise
:










B The Transmission of Ability
To determine the transmission of ability, we consider the test scores of parents (mothers) and
children. Our data are extracted from NLSY79 and NLSY79 Children Cohorts of National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of 12;686
young men and women who were 14 to 22 years of age when ￿rst surveyed in 1979. The dataset in-
cludes the 1980 administration of the Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), which
is used to create Armed Forces Quali￿cations Test (AFQT) Scores, as well as the highest grade
they attended and their age at the time the survey conducted. We converted the AFQT scores
in percentiles into the standardized test scores. To eliminate the bias due to age and schooling
di⁄erence, we calculated the e⁄ect of age and schooling and regression adjusted the AFQT scores





e) only includes those succeeding in education; while
Prob(x0;Ie0=1jx;Ie)
x0 f(x;I
e) also includes those who enroll but fail.
28The NLSY79 Child Sample consists of all children born to female NLSY79 respondents who
completed an interview during the even-year interviews beginning in 1986. The dataset includes
Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT), which measures ability in Math, Reading Recog-
nition, and Reading Comprehension. We used PIAT scores when pupils were 14 years of age and
standardized the Math, Reading Recognition, and Reading Comprehension scores to percentiles.
As a measure of the ability of a child, the average of those three scores are taken.
We chose family income as a proxy for the family background. Family income is calculated by
taking the average of CPI-adjusted income before the year the pupil took the test42. We estimated
the following Galtonian Regression (1886),
x0 = ￿0 + ￿1x + ￿
Table A1 reports the ￿ndings where the sample is divided by income quartiles. It is evident that
a pupil and her mother￿ s ability are correlated. The smarter a mother is, the more likely the pupil
would be of high ability. Regression based on income quartiles provides support for a well-known
fact -the importance of family background in the ability formation. The transmission of ability
appears roughly constant across quartiles. We also looked at the residual plots to con￿rm that
errors are normally distributed. We employ the fact that x0jx has a normal distribution. Figure
A1 depicts the steady-state distribution of ability by schooling completion for our model.
Full By Quartile
Sample Bottom 2nd 3rd Top
Constant -0.05 (1.62) -0.31￿ (4.28) -0.05 (0.79) 0.05 (1.03) 0.13 (1.84)
Mother￿ s Ability 0.40￿ (14.1) 0.27￿ (4.52) 0.35￿ (5.53) 0.31￿ (4.82) 0.30￿ (4.20)
Sample Size 814 301 215 159 139
R2 0.20 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.11
The point estimates with ￿￿￿are statistically signi￿cant at 5% level and the t-statistics are in
the parenthesis.
42The change in family income due to a later change in the family background such as divorce would have nothing
to do a pupil￿ s achievement.
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